Libertarian Strategy Gazette

Volume 1 Number 11

Now on the web at www.cmlc.org

Novem-

A Political Strategy

...Ken Sturzenacker

[A compressed version of this article appeared in the pages of **Liberty** magazine. The full article appears here with permission. Continued from last issue.]

Worse, the LNC has insisted on the intellectually bankrupt fiction that a Libertarian Party line on general election ballots is valuable, important, necessary and equally useful in all states at the same time. Among all of the self-inflating puffery to come out of LP HQ, the myth of 50-state ballot access is among the most destructive barrier to success, even in a presidential year. This penchant for self-abuse has apparently known no bounds, though there are growing signs the blatant deception is being rejected, both inside and outside the Party. In last year's election, which of the third-party nominees got the most attention from the national media?

Hint: it was not the one candidate on the ballot in all 50 states. All too often, the LP's 50-state status was held out as a demand for attention, substituting for many of the actions which would have earned attention.

While that status still holds symbolic importance within the Party, reporters and editors who cover national political campaigns expect it; to them—the ones with the ink and air-time—50-state ballot status is **not** news.

If future contenders for the LP's presidential nomination believe there is a compelling need to see their names on the ballot in all 50 states as part of their overall strategy, perhaps they should be the ones to raise the money and coordinate volunteers and paid workers for ballot access petition drives. Both Ralph Nader and Pat Buchanan both did that in 2000.

The cost-benefit analysis a candidate would have to do might well produce a much different approach to campaign strategy than party members have seen since Ed Clark's nearly one million votes set the LP's record six presidential elections ago.

Clear differences do exist between achieving ballot status in large population states such as California, New York, Texas and Florida and states with low populations such as the Dakotas and Wyoming, or Hawaii, distant as they are from the thoughts of the political media.

For a variety of reasons, some states today are more important than others in terms of building permanent ballot status over time. Ease of getting on the ballot in the first place,

(Continued on page 2)

Lost Business Report

Mathias for State Representative/ Committee to Elect Craig Mathias

C.J. Mathias 26 October 01

For those of you unfamiliar with the term, a "lost business report" is often used in the commercial world to discuss why a given sale fell through. It is normally written by the sales rep who didn't make the sale in the hope that the next sales person will gain some insights that prove helpful in not losing next time. Absolute honesty is essential if documents of this type

are to have any value, and that's what you'll get as you read on.

It's impossible in many cases to determine exactly why the deal failed. The easiest way to do this is to ask the buyer why they didn't buy. In the political world this can be done by exit polling; we didn't do any of this, so the observations below are based on after-the fact evidence and my own analysis. My understanding is that David Euchner is going to file his own report; please note we have not collaborated on our respective documents (and I've not read his). We did, however discuss what happened to some degree, and you may notice some similarities due to this. But what follows is mine alone and it has not been reviewed by anyone other than me.

First of all, some background. We began the campaign last May with the objective of running a politically-experienced Libertarian (me) in a special election for State Representative. The Seventh Middlesex district consists of the southern part of Framingham and all of Ashland. I have been active in Ashland town government for about ten years, having served on the Cable (television) Advisory Committee, the Finance Committee (including a year as Vice Chair), and the Board of Selectmen (my final year as Chairman). I chose not to run for re-election to the Board of Selectmen because I knew is would run for partisan office, I have never been comfortable with running for one elected position while holding another, and I do not believe it is right to hold two elected offices simultaneously. So, I left the Board of Selectmen in May and immediately set to work planning the campaign. I remain in Town government as Chair of the Town Hall Study Committee, and as a member of the (now inactive) Fiscal Affairs Committee. I should also note that I had not planned on running for partisan office so soon; rather, I intended to establish a Town

(Continued on page 5)

(Continued from page 1) [A Political Strategy]

standards for holding ballot status from one election to the next, the viability of a state's LP activists, and access to news media are just four of the many potential considerations.

Except in certain circumstances such as those in Massachusetts in 2000, most Libertarian campaigns for the other federal-level offices—US Senate and US House of Representatives—are far more symbolic than substantive. While the Ditto machine at LP HQ may be flying on the fumes from churning out press release hyping 220+ candidates for Congress, most in the news media read FEC reports wired on little more than nicotine and caffeine. But many LP candidates at the federal level have neither raised nor spent enough to reach the \$5,000 threshold for filing.

If state parties and their potential candidates are not equipped to accomplish ballot access in the first place, of what use is it for the national LP to pour tens of thousands of donor dollars into subsidized petition drives to put onto the ballot candidates nowhere near ready to compete in a general election battle?

Aside: My own adopted home state of Pennsylvania may be a fitting example both of the folly of the '50 states at all costs' mentality **and** of the opportunities for success at other levels.]

In Pennsylvania, if, and only if, any one LP candidate for statewide office earns a vote total at least equal to 2% of the highest winner's statewide total, the name 'Libertarian' remains on voter registration forms the next time they are printed, and the 67 county election boards must maintain 'Libertarian' as a separate category on their records. For both a political body or the higher ranking minor party, the signature requirement (for statewide office) is the same: two percent of the highest winner's total in the most recent previous general election, generally about 25,000 valid signatures. (For Ds and Rs, the required number for statewide office is 2,000 valid.)

The otherwise largely symbolic value to the LNC of having some 25,000 Pennsylvania voters registered 'Libertarian' to add to its national total may be why the LNC approved financial support for LPPa petition drives in "off" years such as 1994 and 1998.

In addition to presidential race in 2000, four other offices were contested statewide: US Senate, attorney general, auditor general, and state treasurer. Even with five opportunities for one candidate to attain 2% of the highest winner's vote to tal, the effort fell short. Indeed, even complete electoral success - electing Libertarians to all of those offices - would not qualify the LP in Pennsylvania for reduced requirements to be on the ballot. The only way to achieve status equal to that of the major parties is to have a minimum of 15% of all Pennsylvania voters - about 1.2 million of them - register

Libertarian. This law is so restrictive that if it were applied to Massachusetts and the District of Columbia, the Republicans would **not** be a major party in those jurisdictions.

In 2002, only one statewide office, that of governor, is open. Two likely rivals for the Democratic nomination less than a year from now have each raised more than five million dollars. (They are former mayor of Philadelphia and, more recently, former general chairman of the Democratic National Committee Ed Rendell, and Robert P. Casey, Jr., one of the sons of former two-term Pennsylvania governor Bob Casey.) So far, no credible Republican opponent has emerged. Despite the rivalry in the primary, the general election result is likely to be a Democratic victory of landslide proportions, making 2% of the winner's total more difficult than usual to achieve.

As recently as the 1998 non-presidential election, eight of 25 state senate seats were not contested in the general election. On the state house side of the legislature, a whopping 83 candidates won without opposition, out of 203 districts.

Rather than spend money on statewide ballot access in 2002, the Pennsylvania LP may well choose to intensify efforts to recruit far more candidates for state legislative offices than it has had. If the LNC insists on spending money in Pa, it might achieve a better return on investment with lobbying to get the state's ballot access laws changed.

At the end of April, midway through what is supposed to be an eight-month process of strategic planning, the governing body of the national Libertarian Party had not yet managed to agree on the most fundamental issue required to start planning: the Party's mission.

By an overwhelming majority, the members of that governing body, the Libertarian National Committee (LNC) have agreed to refuse both to examine or analyze what the Party has accomplished in its 29 year history, or to evaluate its present status by any sort of objective criteria.

With its refusal to evaluate what it has done, or question what it is now doing, the LNC's mindset resembles that of the Queen of Hearts in "Alice in Wonderland." Words mean nothing more or less than the LNC says they mean, which results in words with no meaning at all.

Genuine strategic planning includes the willingness to question everything, including an organization's most cherished beliefs and structures. What is going on inside both the LNC's public and private meetings is not strategic planning.

With some 700 suggestions on the table, the best that can be said for the vast majority of them is that they represent what former LP national secretary John Famularo, (co-organizer of the 1996 LP national convention, the last one operated as

an entrepreneurial venture), calls "process improvement." That is, LNC members believe they already has a very good method of operation, and all they really want is ways to make current HQ activities more effective. How, for example, can it rent better mailing lists and write fundraising letters that produce higher response rates and/or larger donations per response?

No one is willing to challenge, for example, the concept that perhaps fundraising letters per se, by hard copy or email, may not be the most effective tool to reach the LNC's own goals.

What **are** the LNC's goals?

At the moment, that's impossible to discern, because when a group such as the LNC cannot agree on its mission, it is impossible for its members to reach any agreement on its goals. The predominant mentality within the LNC for a decade or more has been that the LP should operate as a membership club, with the associated premise that at some moment in the future, a sufficient number of members - the most recent prediction was 200,000+ - would both be willing to and capable of donating a sum of money large enough to give the LP's presidential candidate a superficial appearance of an actual contender.

LP national membership peaked at slightly more than 33,000 during November 1999, and has trended slightly downward in the 17 months since, despite a presidential campaign, enough candidates to provide a Libertarian majority in the US House of Representatives, and some 1,200 other LP campaigns across the country.

One might contend that the outcome was to be expected. After all, the individual who won the LP's nomination in 2000 had spent much of the three previous years proclaiming that the results in November 2000 would be poor indeed if his sufficient number of members - the 200,000+ - had not been recruited by the end of 1999. With one-sixth of the members he wanted, he got about one-sixth of the results he predicted.

Worse, during the campaign year, LP national membership slipped. Tens of thousands of individuals have been members of the Libertarian Party during its nearly 30-year existence, but now are not. The number of former members exceeds the current number by a substantial margin. One hopes most, if not all, of them are still working toward achieving Liberty in some manner.

A bold LNC working to devise a powerful strategic plan would want to admit to failures in the past and weaknesses in current operations, and would seek to learn from them.

A detailed poll, with an option for essay answers to questions, might well be a useful way to gather insights, perhaps especially if a sampling of current and former members who

have participated in much of the Party's history over the past 20+ years were included.

Given that the process improvement sessions of the LNC seem headed toward affirmation of the supremacy of its membership model; that is, the LP ought to continue to function primarily to build its own membership,....

What, pray tell, are the supposed benefits to the members?

Is it the 12 issues of 'LP News' each year, which devote most space to touting the accomplishments of individuals and local or state organizations which are NOT the national LP? A maximum of fewer than 1,500 are eligible to attend LP national conventions as delegates. What, therefore, is the benefit of membership to the other 30,000 current members?

National LP conventions are held only every other year. What is the membership benefit in any non-convention year? Is it for the frequently more-humorous-than-principled press releases? Is it for the steady stream of fundraising letters for projects which so seldom seem to be funded well enough to achieve their goals? Is it for the growing proliferation of management by created crisis, in which **emergency** email appeals are made for donations to pay bills due 30 days earlier?

If the LNC is serious about strategic planning, among the tasks it must accomplish are these:

- 1) Define and provide sufficient genuine benefits to its members to justify the unproven assumption that an evergrowing number of individuals will invest in membership for membership's sake.
- 2) Demonstrate that its staff at HQ is competent to manage its projects in a timely, professional manner.
- 3) Abandon the mindless mantra of the patently absurd presumption that ballot access is equally valuable, important and necessary in all 50 states.

If there is one lesson we should have learned from Project Archimedes - but apparently have not - it is that asking people to spend money on memberships solely so they can be the recipients of pleas for money for campaigns does NOT motivate huge numbers of people to write checks for membership renewals.

The campaign finance reports filed with the FEC by the Harry Browne for President 2000 campaign, including its 3+ years as an "exploratory committee," indicate that hundreds, and potentially thousands, of individuals donated amounts less than the \$200 threshold required for FEC reporting.

During the 1996 election year, LP national membership increased by more than 8,000. During 2000, LP national membership declined. In a very significant way, the campaigns of

2000—the cumulative time, energy and money of thousands of individuals—failed to translate into a net membership growth.

As of 30 April 2001, LP national membership was at the same level it was at some point back in mid-1999, primarily both because and despite of all the LP campaigns, and the results they produced, during the interim.

The LNC's current model based on membership as a cash cow for primarily for major, top-level campaigns has not worked. It is time for the LNC to give it up.

In strategic planning, everything ought to be questioned: why, for example, is the LP HQ office in DC?

The LP's senior staff members do not consider testifying and lobbying on Capitol Hill or meeting with political reporters among their top priorities.

The LP's communications director spends most of his time inside his office working as editor of 'LP News,' arguably a position of lower rank. In strategic planning, the question of whether the generally "cheerleading" style of the monthly 'LP News' is more valuable than the instructional content of the only occasional 'Volunteer' newsletter would be asked.

The Party's press secretary and political director rarely, if ever, hold news conferences at the National Press Club, outside the branches of Congress, or outside any of the many bureaucracies that plague our lives every day.

Would most members of the national political press corps even recognize our four most senior HQ staffers on the street? Given the state of technology, any LP senior staffer needed for an interview is within easy reach of a local affiliate of any of the major networks producing news. And while the political reporters may be in DC, the news anchors and the control of news operations for the over-the-air networks is in New York City.

For that matter, why is it that paid staffers are the ones quoted in press releases from LP HQ? Why wouldn't it be, for example, the LP's national chairman, or any of the LP's 200+current holders of elective office?

So why are the LP's senior staffers in DC, anyway? Why are all of the party's "backroom" membership and database and fulfillment functions handled in expensive office space in the Watergate?

Let Freedom Ring! Libertarian Strategy Gazette

Subscriptions \$13 per year. Send your money to Carol McMahon, 221 Bumstead Road, Monson MA 01057. Why is the 'LP News' produced at HQ, instead of well outside the expensive confines of the downtown Washington, DC? Why is it done in-house, as opposed to a competitively-bid publication by an outside contractor, as it used to be?

The LP HQ staff certainly do not operate as the intellectual think tank and public policy center for the broad libertarian movement. One could spend days exploring the range of material available at the more than 100 links to free market organizations which have already partnered with Free-Market. net on the web. Students in disciplines as varied as history and the environment, economics and political science can all find enough information to keep them busy writing to meet a full four years of undergraduate requirements.

But all too often, the LP ignores partnerships with libertarian think tanks. Over the years, most of our Party's senior elected officials, and consequently, the senior paid staff at LP HQ, have treated the well-regarded Cato Institute and most other libertarian and free market oriented think tanks merely as competitors for both members and fundraising dollars, rather than allies in potential public policy-campaign partnerships.

For years, senior staff members at LP HQ have generally avoided libertarian think tank public policy forums as though they were afraid of contracting both mad cow and hoof-and-mouth diseases. Why does the editor of 'LP News' ignore the generally excellent work on a wide variety of public policy issues done at any of dozens of free market think tanks, information that could be used by LP activists and candidates at all levels?

If the LNC were to revise the Party's mission to one of supporting candidates for office in winnable races (something public policy think tanks cannot do), the relationship between the LP and the think tanks could change from one of competition for members and money to one of cooperation on issues. When it does, both sides will benefit.

Consider how well chosen is the phrase at the start of the LP's Statement of Principles, "We oppose the cult of the omnipotent state." Think of that cult as fortress, if you will. Day after day, the work of free market think tanks and libertarian writers is to erode the foundations of that fortress, to weaken and undermine it as the predominant presence in our society. With each election, the work of Libertarian candidates is to make direct assaults on the ramparts, seeking vulnerable places at which to breech the walls. If we are to succeed, the LNC would do well to set its sights higher than cannon fodder and instead, send only our willing best, most well-equipped soldiers into battle.

[Ken Sturzenacker is a long-time Party activist.]

(Continued from page 1) Lost Business Report

Committee so as to have a base for a campaign in 2002. But a special election with no incumbent to face was too good of an opportunity to pass up.

The first step (other than mentally conditioning oneself for a significant challenge) was to pick the right campaign manager. Out of the blue came David Euchner; he called me. I knew him only vaguely; I had followed his campaign against Barney Frank last year but was not active in this effort. So I spent some time with Dave on the phone. I was impressed with his energy and experience, and the fact he really wanted the job (which, for those of you who hire people regularly, is a key indicator of success). So, he was made Campaign Manager and Chairman of the Committee to Elect Craig Mathias. In short, he was the boss. I also hired Dennis Corrigan as Treasurer. Dennis had no Office of Campaign and Political Finance (OCPF) experience and was looking for some; I knew he had the financial background and there was no question as to his commitment to the Party. Dennis also asked for the job, again a good sign. I must state here that Dennis did an outstanding job and I recommend him highly; more on Dave Euchner later.

The next step was to outline the effort; detailed schedules were created using Microsoft Project; we also created straw man budgets for \$10,000, \$20,000, and \$30,000 efforts. In the end we raised about \$9,500, and, while we could have used more always!), that was really the minimal spending level we felt comfortable with (as an aside the Spilka camp spent on the order of \$25,000 or so). Dave also set to work rounding up volunteers, and we were blessed with the help of some of the most dedicated people on this planet (but, you already know that!). More on this later as well. The final element was to the plan was a strategy. I do a great of deal of strategic work and know firsthand never to discuss strategy in the middle of the game. There is no point in tipping off the opposition to what you have in mind, so we never commented on strategy to the press nor anyone else. But now that the campaign is over, here are the key elements of what we did:

1) It was my decision not to run a pure Libertarian campaign. Many big-L efforts are designed to raise awareness of the Party. I decided against this and instead wanted to focus on my positions, experience, and record - in short, on me. My core issues were taxation and education funding, the latter being something I've been working on for a long time. We decided not to use guns, drugs, etc. as issues because we could only fight effectively on a couple of fronts. Of course, when other issues came up (drugs did; guns didn't) we stuck to the party line. But the plan was to address financial issues at every opportunity. The campaign literature always mentioned "Libertarian" but not always prominently. The roadside signs had the Statue of Liberty but not the word "Libertarian".

In retrospect, I am still comfortable with this approach. My objective was to win, and not to simply boost the Party as

most of our election efforts are designed to do. I believe that as a Party we need to do more "awareness advertising" and not rely on campaigns to build image and awareness. A campaign should solely focus on electing the candidate. Period.

2) We decided to build momentum slowly. We waited until after the primary so that we would know who the Democratic candidate would be, and to allow the issues the Democrats debated to rise to the top. Two of the candidates (Michael Crowe and David Teller) were moderates, while the other two (Suzanne Aymes and Karen Spilka) were serious statists. We felt the battle would be between Spilka and Teller, and Spilka in fact won. Aymes, the only Framingham candidate, should have won, but failed to properly mobilize Framingham voters. Spilka built a coalition of education activists and soccer moms (she's on the School Committee in Ashland) and this strategy worked just great. She also got a lot of help from Dave Magnani, our state senator. She pressed all of the usual Democratic buttons, including union endorsements. As to issues, though, we were disappointed—the primary campaign was boring.

We had assumed that the clear differences between a statist and a Libertarian would produce an excellent contrast and we'd have a good shot. Unfortunately, a Republican (Michael Horrigan) entered the race rather late in the game. We had tried before this to convince the Republicans to support us. But they are in very much the same boat that we are and could not afford to go without a candidate (and they were also likely afraid that we were gaining on them). Horrigan is 21 years old, but not without experience (he's a Town Meeting Member in Framingham). But he was clearly not their first choice and was certainly green as a candidate. So, our concern was that we'd end up splitting the fiscal conservative vote, or even losing it to, the Republicans. This likely did happen in the end.

Anyway, we really got busy after the primary with a steady effort of standouts, door-to-doors (always asking if we could put up a sign, and a large number of people said yes - in the end, we had more signs than either of the other two candidates), and phone calls to likely voters (if you're interested, I'll tell you how to create the lists, but I learned it from Dave Euchner). We also decided on a large (10,000 piece) mailing and a series of newspaper ads up to and including election day. The final element was a presence at the polls, and the volunteers really came through for us here. I also want to recognize here the work of Laura Hirschmann, who designed many of our materials, including the signs and the

3) We also decided to run a professional campaign with no overtly negative advertising. I most certainly hit my opponents on the issues, but I always told the truth and never directly attacked their character.

The results, however, were not pretty. Here are the raw

numbers ("P" indicates precinct):

Ashland	P1	P2	P3	P	4	Tota	l Sha	are	
Horrigan	60	104	77	42	2	283	19.10	0%	
Mathias	60	59	44	22	2	185	12.48	3%	
Spilka	261	322	263	16	51	1007	67.9	5%	
Blanks	1	3	2	1		7			
Write-Ins	0	0	0	0)	0			
Total	382	488	386	22	26	1482	2		
Framingham P8A P8B P11 P12 P14 P15 P16 P17 Total									
hare									
Horrigan	42	26	136	41	43	86	30	26	430
39.23%									
Mathias	9	10	24	8	4	5	5	2	67
6.11%									
Spilka	55	62	181	83	33	112	25	34 5	585
53.38%									
Blanks	0	1	0	0	3	4	0	0	8
Write-Ins	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	6
Total	107	99	342	133	84	20	7 61	63	1096
Note: Total voter turnout was 9%									

	Total `	Votes	% of Total
Horriga	n	713	28%
Mathias	3	252	10%
Spilka		1592	62%
Total		2557	

Note that turnout was exceptionally low, and much lower than we assumed it would be. This race attracted little attention and minimal press coverage. The second debate wasn't even reported by the MetroWest Daily News!

So here is what I think happened:

- 4) "Democrat Effect" First of all, the district is highly Democratic and we knew that there was a better than even chance the Democrat would win, no matter who they were, and, in fact, no matter what. We didn't have the benefit of issues-based advertising or awareness advertising to get voters over the hurdle of "Libertarian". The voters likely did not and still do not see the need for a third party, no matter how experienced or otherwise good the candidate of said third party might be.
- 5) "Republican Effect"—I do not believe that Mike Horrigan's strong showing is indicative of any underlying Republican support. Rather, as the sole Framingham candidate, he received the votes of those who wanted to keep the representation in Framingham, where it has always been. They'd even elect a Republican to do this. Indeed, the proposed redistricting would add more bulk to the Framingham side of the district, so we might see a Framingham challenger to Spilka next year. I also expect David Teller to run again, but this is based more on bad blood between him and Spilka than honest philosophical differences (I like David very much, but his campaign most certainly did not have a philosophical basis). Regardless, having a Framingham Republican in the race hurt us. It did not appear we would have to

deal with this problem when we got started; I even checked with the Republicans before I signed on.

- 6) "Libertarian Effect"—As a party, we still don't have the legitimacy nor the visibility we need. I believe I personally would have done much better as an independent or even as a Republican. But I don't believe in compromising principles just to get elected; so doing makes us no better than them. I think a lot of people who would have voted for me were simply scared off by the "L". Consequently, I believe we have a great deal of public-relations work to do.
- 7) Light Turnout—This should have helped us, but what it really indicates is that the voters of this district are entrenched even in small numbers. I believe the campaign's PR efforts did have some effect (based on responses to cold calls and unsolicited feedback), but most voters aren't going to change their stripes overnight. I am convinced that everincreasing taxes will eventually break the backs of many taxpayers and we will have a big opportunity at that point.
- 8) September 11—The voters most definitely were not focused on the campaign. It is unclear, however, if they would have paid any more attention in more normal times. One could argue that it wouldn't matter whom was elected. The House is dominated by Democrats (and run by a tyrant), so another Democrat won't change the agenda or the results at all. And adding a Republican wouldn't do much good. Nor would adding a Libertarian, other than, as the MetroWest Daily News noted, the House would be more interesting with me expounding from the floor. And one must also consider that as long as we allow the agenda to be set by a single individual elected by an atypical community, it really won't matter who gets in at all. The real value from winning for us would have been in the publicity and visibility, not our effect on legislation or results.

So, anyway, we could have spent more money and run more ads and done more mailings, but I don't think it would have had much effect.

9) I was also deeply troubled by not receiving the CLT [GP: Citizen's for Limited Taxation & Government, a Massachusetts anti-tax group) endorsement (it went to Horrigan). I asked for it, and I've been a member and supporter of CLT for a long time. I can't imagine there was anything in my responses to their questionnaire that could have given them pause, unless I misinterpreted one of the questions. I could not go to their recent event because Ashland Town Meeting was on the same night and I was on the agenda (to deliver a report on the Town Hall project). I must attribute at least part of this loss to the recent conflict between certain of our more visible members and CLT. Dave also suggested to me that CLT is really more of a Republican organization than a Libertarian one, and we're wrong to assume they are on our side in every case. Still, they endorsed Horrigan, someone who publicly said he'd like to see the state budget rise 5% per year. Even though he took the tax pledge and has indicated he's against raising taxes, it's hard to see how we can add

\$1+ billion in new spending every year without raising taxes. Limited taxation and government, indeed.

10) I also think there is now a significant conflict between two camps within the Massachusetts Party itself. On the one side we have the all-or-nothing group, who favor "boldness' on every issue. And on the other we have the gradualists, who are looking to get into the game via one or two issues while compromising when necessary on others, usually by ignoring them. I most certainly fall into the latter camp; I believe politics is about compromise. We cannot simply impose our total vision of government without either (a) waiting a long time to get into positions of power via the usual electoral process, or (b) an outright revolution. Neither of these options is acceptable to me. We must win the hearts and minds of those who are either our outright opponents, or (the vast majority) those who really don't know what we have to offer. Ramming our way of life down their throats makes us no better than the other parties.

Nonetheless, the failure of the "bold" group to support my candidacy was a problem. Their endorsement would have been valuable and would have helped save Party unity. As it is today, I think the split is real and we need to either heal it or realize that we are going to lose a few people over it. There is no such thing as a "pure" Libertarian, nor should there be. We much encourage debate even among ourselves. There should be no purity tests nor kool-aid rituals here.

- 11) While we had a great staff of volunteers, especially on election day, we never really had enough to be effective. I spent close to full time on the campaign during its last month. I have lost thousands of dollars in incomeas a result, as well as having (voluntarily) spent almost \$2,000 out of my own pocket. Karen Spilka had way more people working for her, and their effort made the difference in the primary. We need to grow more members, but most importantly we need to turn those members into activists.
- 12) One other note we should have put up a lot more signs outside of the polling places on the night before the election, and pre-positioned materials (such as the hand-held signs) with key volunteers the night before as well. I'm not sure this would have made a big difference in the outcome, but I suggest it nonetheless.

In summary, we ran this campaign to win; we didn't. We did better on a percentage basis that the last Libertarian campaign for this seat (and my hat is still off to Carl Garfield), but with substantially more time and money invested. I think we need to address the above issues (visibility, awareness, staffing) at our earliest convenience if we are to make progress in the future.

And finally, there is a possibility that I am simply just not a good candidate. I think I did everything right, but it may be that there is just something about me that the voters didn't like. I don't think this is the case, but personal responsibility is a big part of who I am. Ultimately, the responsibility for the failure rests with me, and I accept it. I have no plans to run for elective office again, although one never knows. I am going to help out on Ilana Freedman's campaign, because I find her inspirational and someone who can carry our message with grace, professionalism, and effectiveness. I am available to help with other efforts on a time-

available basis (but, note, I have big college bills to pay and need to get back to my day job before Donna finds out how much this little effort really cost!). And I am always available to talk; you can reach me in my office at 508-881-6467 (the campaign phone number and Web site are now disconnected).

Some closing notes:

- 1) Many, many thanks to everyone who donated to, worked on, or otherwise supported this campaign. You people are simply the best, and I want you to know how much I appreciate your efforts. And, fear not, we are going to win. I am honored to have been part of the R&D effort leading to our eventual victories and our dominance of Massachusetts and American politics.
- 2) And I want to extend a very special thank you to David Euchner. I have never seen anyone, in any capacity, put so much effort, intelligence, and just plain heart into any project of any form any time in my life. This is a man who, at a relatively tender age, lived the experience of this campaign with astonishing energy, commitment, and wisdom. I am not an easy person to manage (a former boss of mine once called me *insubordinate*; he was most certainly right and I took it as a compliment), but I never once questioned Dave's decisions. He told me what to do, and I did it, and I believe every activity was the right one. If we did anything wrong, it was in my execution, and not in Dave's plans. He has my undying admiration and I will forever be indebted to him.

Electing One Libertarian What Could Be Accomplished

[As sent to us by Sean Haugh of the Libertarian Party of North Carolina.] [Continued some more]

Here are the overall highlights of the glorious Plan: end the War on Drugs: release inmates and stop further prosecutions of those arrested for drug possession and sales, resulting in a 26% cut for Department of Corrections and most agencies of the Judicial Department, plus a host of boards and rogue agencies scattered in other departments;

legalize marijuana and apply a 4% excise tax to retail sales; make polluters pay the full cost of environmental damage they themselves caused, raising revenue to fund environmental protection and cleanup programs;

abolish the offices of Lieutenant Governor and Administrative Hearings;

eliminate all public aid to private institutions;

eliminate almost all licensing and inspections (including hunting & Damp; fishing, occupational, business, industrial, marriage, and pollution discharge licenses);

eliminate escheats (a subtly radical concept -- by defunding escheats, no longer is it assumed that the state is the rightful owner of lost or abandoned property);

privatize alcohol sales and abolish the Alcohol Beverage Control Board;

abolish utilities regulation;

raise museum fees to cover 50% of operating expenses; lower fulltime enrollment status at state universities to raise tuition;

sell the Western NC Executive Mansion and the Governor's airplane;

sell the NC Railroad and state-owned ports;

gut the Department of Revenue, including decreasing enforcement and auditing power by 50% (payback, my friends, is a true bitch);

raise public school teachers' salaries 2%; raise retirees' cost of living allowance 4%; eliminate the following programs: public television, scholarships for private universities, all "Governor's Councils", advisory boards and internal advocacy groups, the Housing Finance Agency, Division of Motor Vehicles, all new highway construction, abortion services, a wide array of programs for agricultural research and corporate welfare, public transportation, and many many many more single line item programs; and eliminate the following taxes: sales taxes on food and nonprescription drugs, inheritance and gift taxes, and the "Intangibles Tax" on investments.

While this seems like a radical laundry list, I really could have gone much further. I hardly touched education, social services, or cultural resources. But I decided to take the strategy of pushing for what I thought I might be able to actually get, in a language my fellow mock legislators could understand. I felt that if I called for the complete elimination of social services, or separation of school and state, I'd get laughed out of committee immediately. I deliberately picked targets that I knew other Senate committee members would be interested in, and theoretically saved new cuts for the next session.

To Be Continued

Stand Up for Liberty!

George Phillies exciting new book of Libertarian Party strategy is now available as an ebook in multiple formats from Third Millenium Publishing, http://3mpub.com.

Grassroots Libertarians

dedicated to fixing the Libertarian Party from the bottom up. Now on the web at www.grassroots-libertarians.org.
Our Message: "Just Be Active! Run for Office!
Campaign! Help!"

Pioneer Valley Libertarian Association

Massachusetts' oldest local Libertarian group, with regular meetings since 1995. We meet the second Wednesday of every month at Bickford's Family Restaurant, Old Boston and Pasco Roads, Springfield.

Our Web Pages

http://www.pvla.net http://www.cmlc.org
Brought to you by www.excell.net.
Libertarian owned—Libertarian operated
Provider of internet services

